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ABSTENTION AND CERTIFICATION IN DIVERSITY SUITS:
"PERFECTION OF MEANS AND CONFUSION
OF GOALS"*
PUSHIIG a rule to the limits of its logic is normally a game confined to the
classroom. But courts, in a recent series of diversity cases, have manipulated the
abstention doctrine to drive the rule in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' to its outer-
most bounds. As a consequence, the conflict between the diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts and the premises of Erie has sharpened. The dispute, in
terms of abstention doctrine, concerns the range of circumstances in which
the federal courts are required, or have discretion, to refer litigants to state
courts for clarification of state law. Until recently that range has been nar-
rowly circumscribed; but there is increasing evidence of a willingness on the
part of federal courts exercising their diversity jurisdiction to abstain mere-
ly because the state law is unsettled. Because of the implications of this de-
velopment for diversity jurisdiction, the desirability of such a substantial
change in the complexion of federal jurisdiction must be evaluated in view
of its potential for harsh effects upon the litigants as well as its significance
for the federal judiciary.2 What Congress has consistently refused to do by
legislation," the courts may be busily achieving.
The Early Doctrine
The doctrine of abstention began humbly.4 As first formally announced by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,5 it seemed de-
signed to permit a federal court to postpone and perhaps avoid decision of
constitutional issues - in the particular case, the commission's authority to
issue an order enforcing certain discriminatory hiring practices - in the hope
that an unconstrued state statute would be so interpreted by the state court
to obviate meeting the constitutional questions raised. This technique seemed
harmonious with the "deeply rooted," though judge-made doctrine of avoiding
*"Perfection of means and confusion of goals seem-in my opinion-to characterize
our age." - Albert Einstein in Out of My Later Years.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
423-34 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring), "Today we put federal jurisdiction in jeopardy."
Id. at 427; Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1960) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) ; Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 346-48 (1963).
3. See note 44 infra.
4. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTs § 52 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT];
BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - RULES EDITION § 64 (Wright
ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HoLTZoFF] ; Note, 59 CoLum. L. REV. 749, 752-
766 (1959) ; Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 227-34 (1959) ; Note, 69 YALE L. . 643-48
(1960), which analyze the development of the doctrine. See also IA MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE f 0203[1], ff 0.203[2] (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
5. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman is generally considered to be the progenitor of the
abstention doctrine.
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premature constitutional decisions.6 A second discrete basis for abstention was
subsequently established: where under state regulatory schemes "expeditious
and adequate" state review was provided to aggrieved parties, serious disrup-
tion of the complex state regulatory scheme by federal courts should be avoided.
This rationale was first announced in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 7 where a state
commission order for proration in Texas oil fields was challenged on equal
protection grounds; there had been a long history of serious disruption of the
complex state regulatory scheme by federal courts. The Buford rationale has
been so broadened by subsequent cases, that now abstention is likely to be
applied in any attempt to enjoin a state regulatory body in a federal court.8
From this narrow opening in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, pressure
developed for abstention in diversity cases presenting difficult or uncertain
questions of state law. Attempts to obtain this goal were firmly rebuffed in
Meredith v. Winter Haven,9 the first time the question of abstention in such
circumstances was presented to the Court. A Florida district court, presented
with a "pure" question of state law in a diversity case, dismissed the plaintiff's
case with prejudice. The Fifth Circuit reversed, instructing the court to enter
a dismissal without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to proceed in state courts
on the state law questions. The Supreme Court refused to allow this extension.
In the majority's view, neither Erie nor the abstention doctrine, said to have
vitality only "in exceptional cases," justified the circuit court's decision:
[D] ifficulties of ascertaining.., state law ... do not in themselves afford
a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction
to decide a case which is properly brought to it for a decision.
The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the fed-
eral courts or to serve their convenience. Its purpose was generally to
afford to suitors an opportunity . .. to assert their rights in the federal
rather than in the state courts. In the absence of some recognized public
policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction con-
ferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it has
6. See Note, 69 YALE L.J. 643-44 (1960); Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 227-34
(1959) ; Note, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 749, 752-57 (1959).
The policy can be traced at least as far back as Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v.
Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) : The Court will not "anticipate a question
of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." See also Mr. Justice
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.
288, 346-47 (1936).
7. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See Note, 69 YALE L.J. 643, 644-47 (1960) ; Note, 108 U.
PA. L. REv. 226, 230-31 (1959) ; Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749, 757-62 (1959).
8. Cf. 1A MooRE f[ 0.20311], at 2103-09. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
In addition to those cases falling within the Pullman or Burford rationale, there are
a number of other situations referred to as abstention cases. For a discussion of these
"miscellaneous" cases, see Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749, 762-66; 1A MooRE, [ 0.203[2]
(discussion of Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 [1940]). See also,
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176
(1935), two leading examples.
9. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
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from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their
jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law when-
ever necessary to the rendition of a judgment .... 10
The language in Meredith expressed the harshness of the Court's reaction
to a broader application of the abstention doctrine. It did not distinguish be-
tween situations where abstention would be mandatory and a perhaps broader
group of situations where abstention might be granted in a court's discretion."
Furthermore, there was no recognition of a difference in impact if the absten-
tion was achieved by stay rather than dismissal. These distinctions, though
they may be in fact quite formal,'12 may have some appeal to a judge who does
not want to appear to have ignored the Meredith mandate by giving up juris-
diction vested in him, yet wishes the freedom to abstain from decision on diffi-
cult questions of state law.
The doctrinal importance of these distinctions became apparent when the
Supreme Court met its next wave of abstention cases. On a single decision
day in June, 1959, the Supreme Court decided five abstention cases. 13 Where
previously abstention had been granted only in the context of equitable relief
sought against a governmental body or agent, and had appeared to express
a judicial duty, the Court for the first time approved abstention invoked as
10. 320 U.S. at234. See WRIGHT § 52, at 175; 1A MoORE ff 0.20312], at 2119-21.
11. The Supreme Court has often discussed abstention as though it were a unitary
doctrine, without recognizing the possibility that in some cases abstention might be
deemed mandatory and in others discretionary; or that in some cases it might be achieved
by stay, and in others by dismissal. E.g., in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228
(1943), the Court does not seem to recognize these distinctions. Id. at 235-36. In Spector
Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944), the Court in ordering a district court
to stay proceedings before it cites, inter alia, Burford v. Sun Oil, in which abstention was
accomplished by dismissal. Id. at 105. In other cases the Court, while not articulating
these distinctions, is more consistent in its citations. E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S.
167, at 176-77 (1959). However, the attempt to develop the stay-dismissal distinction in
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 38 (1959) is perhaps
the first attempt of the Court to develop this notion. It may be suggested that the term
"abstention" has invited such a gloss, that it describes the result of judicial actio; rather
than the factors calling forth action, and so invites indiscriminate use.
12. As the Supreme Court recently conceded, abstention implemented by staying
federal court proceedings is likely to place the disposition of all questions in the hands
of state courts. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1963). See England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-419 (1964) ; Note, Consequences of
Abstention by A Federal Court, 73 HAuv. L. REv. 1358, 1361-65 (1960). Similarly, a line
of cases permitting abstention is likely to evolve without change into one requiring it.
Cf. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), as extended by Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
13. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959) ; Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) repre-
sented "the earlier pattern of decision, although each contains an aspect of special import
in the application of the doctrine." Note, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 226, 235 (1959). The other
two cases were County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) ; and
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). See notes 15 &
16 infra.
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a matter of discretion, undertaken in a common-law action,14 and involving
what appeared to be little more than a difficult unclear question of state law.
By finding distinctions which few had supposed to exist before, the Court
called into serious question both the exceptional nature of the abstention
doctrine and the Meredith affirmation of federal court duty in diversity cases
to decide state law questions, however perplexing.
The result of the Court's work that day is not yet understood. In the two
most significant cases, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,15
and County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,16 the Court seemed to pull
in opposite directions. 17 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in
14. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), was the
first case to apply the doctrine to an action at law, uncomplicated by the presence of
factors which provided the rationale for abstention in the earlier cases, and was thus
seen as a possible signal for the expansion of the doctrine. "[P]rior cases have been
cases in equity. . 360 U.S. at 28. (Frankfurter, J.). WRIGHT § 52, at 174 (1963).
Compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attempt to minimize the significance of the "equity"
origin of the doctrine by reference to the supposed "special and peculiar" nature of emi-
nent domain proceedings, 360 U.S. at 28, with the Pullnan opinion, 312 U.S. at 500,
which places heavy stress upon the significance of equity.
Nor was there any constitutional question which would justify Pidlhnan-type abstention:
The suggestion that federal constitutional questions lurk in the background is so
patently frivolous that neither the District Court, the Court of Appeals, nor this
Court consider it to be worthy of even passing reference.
360 U.S. 25, 33 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. 360 U. S. 25 (1959). The Thibodaux case involved a suit at law by the power
company challenging a threatened eminent domain taking by the city. The City of Thibo-
daux filed a petition for expropriation in one of the Louisiana state courts, asserting the
taking of certain power company property. The company, a Florida corporation, removed
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on the basis
of diversity of citizenship. After a pre-trial hearing the federal judge, on his own motion,
stayed the proceedings "until the Supreme Court of Louisiana has been afforded an op-
portunity to interpret" the relevant state statute. The Fifth Circuit reversed on appeal.
Id. at 25-26. The city was acting under a previously unconstrued Louisiana statute (LA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 101 [1950]), the construction of which was placed in doubt by an
opinion of the state attorney general. 360 U.S. at 30. The opinion appears at [1950-1952]
Ops. LA. AT'y GEN. 142. See City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 153
F. Supp. 515, 517 (E.D. La. 1957); Note, 69 YALE L.J. 643, 652-53 and accompanying
foutnotes 63-66.
16. 360 U.S. 185 (1959). While condemnation proceedings were pending in a Penn-
sylvania state court, the property owners brought suit in a federal district court for a
judgment of ouster, alleging that the taking was for private use and therefore contrary
to state law. The district court, though acknowledging that its jurisdiction had been
properly invoked, dismissed the suit. The Third Circuit reversed. There was no federal
constitutional issue involved, and the relevant state law was clear - the case turning
solely upon a factual determination: whether or not the proposed taking was for a public
or private purpose. See id. at 187-90.
17. The two cases are extremely difficult to reconcile either with the earlier cases
or with each other. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 235 (1959). The majority in Thibo-
daux, note 15 supra, sought to justify that case on the special nature of eminent domain
proceedings (360 U.S. at 26) and upon the distinction between Meredith v. Winter Haven,
1964]
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Thibodaux commended a district judge for referring to state courts the con-
struction of an old eminent domain statute of doubtful meaning; Mr. Justice
Brennan dissented for three justices. In Mashuda, Mr. Justice Brennan, now
writing for the majority, affirmed a circuit court reversal of a district court
decision dismissing a diversity action contesting eminent domain proceedings;
Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in a four-justice dissent by Mr. Justice Clark.
The one judicial attempt at reconciliation, by Mr. Justice Stewart,' 8 portended
a significant retreat from Meredith's broad injunction against abstaining for
"mere" reasons of difficulty of state law. A federal district court, he suggested,
could not, consistent with its duty in diversity cases, dismiss a case unless it
fell within the exceptional categories suggested by cases like Burford, where
considerations of harmonious federal-state relations were crucial; yet, where
an important issue of state law was unclear, it was within the discretion of
the federal judge sitting in diversity to stay the action before his court until
state law questions had been resolved. 19 The majority in Thibodaux relied, at
least in part, on the same distinctions. Although the result in Meredith may
be reconciled with Thibodaux by using such distinctions, the tenor of Meredith
cannot, and the distinctions may prove frail reeds.2 0 The attempts to limit the
role of the federal judiciary in diversity suits - which had been sharply re-
buffed in Meredith without recognition of any distinctions between stay and
dismissal, mandate or discretion - appear to have achieved substantial success
in Thibodaux. Particularly when coupled with views he articulated in earlier
dissenting opinions, 2 ' Justice Frankfurter's Thibodaux opinion strongly sug-
gested that an abandonment of Meredith v. Winter Haven was under way, and
that abstention was to be available as a matter of discretion in all, or many,
diversity cases in which relevant state law was unclear.
320 U.S. 228 (1934) (note 9 supra), and Thibodaux, that in, one case abstention had been
attempted by dismissal and, in the other, merely by stay. 360 U.S. at 27 n. 2. The dissenters
took sharp issue:
Since the Court suggests no adequate basis of distinction between the two cases,
it should frankly announce that Meredith v. Winter Haven is overruled, for no
other conclusion is reasonable.
360 U.S. at 38 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan also attacked the eminent domain distinction: "Surely eminent domain is
no more mystically involved with 'sovereign prerogative' than ... a host of other govern-
mental activities carried on by the States... ." 360 U.S. at 37. The dissent's point was
carried home by the majority opinion in Mashuda, which also involved a challenge to
eminent domain proceedings. See the opinion of Brennan, J., for the Court in Mashuda,
note 10 supra, 360 U.S. at 186-98, See WRIGHT § 52, at 175.
18. Mr. Justice Stewart joined the majority in both Thibodaux and Mashuda. He
wrote a concurring opinion in Thibodaux in which he suggests the basis of reconciliation.
See 360 U.S. at 31.
19. Ibid.
20. See notes 11 and 12 supra.
21. See Justice Frankfurter's dissents in Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402, 412 (1952);
Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 493 (1949) ; and cases cited in Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,
40-41.
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The Fifth Circuit's Embellishments
If that was the implication of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, it has re-
cently borne fruit. Lower federal courts are showing increased proclivity
toward "discretionary abstention" in diversity cases. "I was a member of the
Court that launched Pullman and sent it on its way,"'22 Mr. Justice Douglas
noted during the current Term. "But if I had realized the creature it was to
become, my doubts would have been far deeper than they were. "23 The most
striking instances of this expansion are two recent Fifth Circuit cases, in
which the circuit court has stayed proceedings before it until such time as
uncertain state law might be ascertained in the appropriate state courts.
Green v. American Tobacco Co.,2 4 was a diversity action brought in the Florida
District Court by a citizen of Florida seeking damages for wrongful death
allegedly due to lung cancer caused by defendant's cigarettes. Florida law
governed the rights and liabilities of the parties. There was no constitutional
claim, no unconstrued statute, and no governmental party. In the absence of
any controlling Florida decision, the circuit court was uncertain whether
Florida common law would impose absolute liability on a cigarette manufac-
turer for breach of implied warranty. The court at first attempted to answer
the question itself; on rehearing it reversed itself, in an unreasoned per curiam
opinion,25 and certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court under
that state's unique certification statute,28 which explicitly provides for certifica-
tion of questions of state law from federal appellate courts to the highest state
court. In the second and most recent case, United Services Life Ins. Co. v.
Delaney,2 7 the circuit court abstained from decision in two cases governed by
22. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 425 (1964).
23. Ibid.
24. 304.F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), on subsequent proceedings, 325 F.2d 673 (1964),
petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEE: 3371 (U.S. April 21, 1964) (No. 961).
25. Id. at 85. The defendant had judgment in the District Court. On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed by a divided panel. 304 F.2d 70. "[O]n the morning of the argument,
the Court [sua sponte] asked counsel to consider whether it should certify any issue to
the Supreme Court of Florida. . . ." Further Supplemental Brief for Appellee Re Possible
Certification to Florida Supreme Court, p, 1, Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d
70 (5th Cir. 1962). On rehearing the court 6rdered the abstention. The per curialn order
is at 304 F.2d 85. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certificate by opinion. 154
So. 2d 169 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1963). The Fifth Circuit then, reversed the original judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings in the District Court. Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963) (one judge dissenting in part).
While the Fifth Circuit did cite the United States Supreme Court's decision in Clay
v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U. S. 207 (1960), that citation was made without suggestion
that the reasoning in Clay supported the abstention ordered in Green; rather it seemed
more likely to have been cited merely to indicate that the Florida certification procedure
had been previously invoked in Clay.
27. 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed sub nor. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3371 (U.S. April 21, 1964) (No.
958). Similar attitudes can be sensed in other circuits. In A.F.L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Wis. 1960) an injunction was sought against
Chrysler to enjoin cancellation of the plaintiff's franchise in alleged violation of Wis.
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the Texas common law of insurance. Confused about the meaning of state
decisions, a sharply divided court, sitting en banc, required the parties to seek
not only declaratory judgment in the base-line Texas courts, but also review
of that judgment in "a court of last resort."2s Mere uncertainty about state
decisional law 29 - exactly what Meredith had stated to be irrelevant to the
duties of federal judges to hear diversity cases - seems to have formed the
sole reason for the Fifth Circuit's action. The four judge dissent in Delaney
decried the departure from the duties outlined in Meredith, albeit the opinion
hinted that the presence of a certification procedure like that of Florida might
have stilled its voice.3 0 A concurrence by Judge Brown explicitly defended
the decision to exercise the discretion to abstain on Erie grounds, asserting
that responsibility was not abdicated, since by staying rather than dismissing
the proceedings before it the court preserved its ultimate right to decide the
case.
The adventurousness of the Fifth Circuit can be explained in terms of the
omnipresent Erie. Once Pullman started abstention down the tracks, use of
that technique could be justified, if not required, where the only "problem"
of significance is the existence of unclear state law. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said:
STAT. ANN. § 218.01(3) (a), subd. (16) & (17) (1957). Defense counsel did not rely
upon any constitutional ground so far as the motion before the court was concerned,
though the court was obviously aware of, and considered, possible constitutional over-
tones. 183 F. Supp. at 59. However, these constitutional grounds seem to have been in-
substantial. See Note, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 450, 453 n.19. The meaning of the statute was
unclear and the court was "unable to get any help from the decisions" available. 183 F.
Supp. at 59-60. While the court did not order abstention, it clearly condoned the parties'
desire for declaratory judgment. Id. at 60-61. Apparently the only reason that a formal
abstention order was not made was that:
... in its normal order this case will not be reached for trial on the merits for
many months, giving the parties ample opportunity to endeavor to get an authori-
tative construction of the statute by the State courts.
183 F. Supp. at 61. The court clearly stated that the case "is a situation in which the
abstention doctrine could well be applied." Id. at 60. Professor Wright has said: "The
abstention ordered in A.F.L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. . . .has no basis
except that the diversity action presented a question of State law not yet decided by the
State courts." WRIGHT § 52, at 175 n.42.
In another case the First Circuit has sanctioned abstention under circumstances similar
to those in A.F.L. Motors and Green. See Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303
F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1962). Cf., the concurring opinion of Judge Friendly in Essex Universal
Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 580 (2d Cir. 1962).
In a very recent Fifth Circuit case a Louisiana federal district judge's refusal to ab-
stain as a matter of discretion, was affirmed. American Universal Ins. Co. v. Chauvin,
No. 20902, 5th Cir., March 12, 1964. See also Keidan v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
No. 15349, 6th Cir., Feb. 13, 1964 (abstention denied).
28. 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1964).
29. Neither the Pullman, stpra, note 5, nor the Burford, supra note 7, rationale has
any applicability to Green or Delaney, which were diversity suits between private parties.
The only relevant precedent seems to be Meredith v. Winter Haven, supra note 10.
30. 328 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
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* . . no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it
cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination. The last
word on [state law] . . . belongs neither to us nor to the district court
but to the [state supreme court].... In this situation a federal court...
is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be
displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication.... The reign of law is hardly
promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted
by a controlling decision of a state court.31
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's notion fits comfortably with the view that Erie
demands something closely approaching an identity of result, whether suit
be brought in state or federal court. And it was frustration in the task of
"forecasting" which seemed at the root of Judge Brown's concurrence in
Delaney. His circuit, he indicated, bad recently been "reversed" by state courts
in a substantial number of cases.
[Ti he "outcome determinative" test... judge-fashioned to meet the needs
of Erie, only few of which had emerged when Meredith... was announced
in 1943 . . . recognizes that it is basically unfair for decision to turn on
irrelevant accidents such as state citizenship, residence, geography, or
the case being filed in one courthouse, rather than in one a block down
the street.
If in like cases diverse results are unfair when precipitated by quasi
procedural rules . . . how much more unfair is it when diverse result
flows from diverse holdings on substantive law.
32
It is clear under Erie that where there is state authority which clearly
answers the questions of state law involved, that law must prevail, and a federal
court may make no independent determination. 33 There are those who would
take Erie no further; they say that at least so far as it was a constitutional
decision, it was directed only to the Black & White Taxicab34 fact situation,
where a federal court simply ignored exsiting state decisional law.33 This
narrow view would not extend Erie to the case where no state law exists, and
draws strength from the Court's observation that Erie "is itself a precedent
against any general ruling that cases properly in the federal courts that depend
upon state law should have that issue submitted to state courts for decision."
36
But, for the present, others who claim that Erie compels something more closely
approaching an identity of result between state and federal courts seem to
have carried the day.3 7 Of course, if Erie is read to compel as near an identity
31. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500.
32. 328 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1964).
33. E.g., West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
34. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
35. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEma 619
(1953) [hereafter cited as HaRT & WECHSLER]. See also Parker, Dital Sovereignty and
the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 407, 411 (1956).
36. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490-91 (1949).
37. Cf., Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights; To a More Perfect
Union, 40 TEXAs L. REv. 211, 220 (1961) ; Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye
View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TULANE L. REv. 443, 466 (1962).
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of outcome as possible whether the suiA be brought in state or federal courts,
then abstention is surely a desirable end in cases in which there are unclear
questions of state law, if the doctrine can be implemented in a manner con-
sonant with other policies. For a state court may always reach a result incon-
sistent with a prior federal decision on the same question of state law, when
that question finally comes before it.38 By referring state law questions which
arise in federal courts to the state court for decision, such inconsistencies may
be avoided.
Green and Delaney at Trial Level - Rationales for Diversity Jurisdiction
An examination of the bases of diversity jurisdiction suggests that abstention
ought not to be extended at the district court level to the degree implied by
Green and Delaney, for it is here, at the trial level, that most of the significant
advantages of diversity seem to be grouped. The historic basis of diversity
remains unclear,3 9 but it is generally suggested that the Framers of the Con-
stitution included that jurisdiction out of a desire to protect out-of-state liti-
gants from the feared bias of local courts and juries.40 Chief Justice Marshall,
in an oft quoted dictum, stated that the Constitution provided for diversity
jurisdiction because it "either entertains apprehensions ... or views with...
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors .... -41 Later,
Justice Story, in another influential dictum, spoke to the same effect.42 Whether
or not such prejudice ever existed is an unresolved question, as is whether it
exists today. The promptness of congressional/action to create federal courts
to sit in diversity cases, 43 and the continued congressional resistance to pres-
sures to end the jurisdictional grant suggest that the danger is at least felt
38. See the cases cited in Judge Brown's concurrence in Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486-
87 nn. 5-9 (5th Cir. 1964).
39. The origin of diversity jurisdiction has been the source of much significant legal
writing. The classic articles are Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, 37 HAxv. L. REv. 49 (1923) ; Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. Rxv. 483 (1928) ; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power
,Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Yntema and
Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 869 (1931)
(answer to Frankfurter's article) ; Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial
System, 13 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1948). See also the excellent collection of ref-
erences and notes in HART & WEcHSLER 7-37 (constitutional origin), 892-97 (diversity
jurisdiction).
40. Frank, stpra note 39, at 22-28; Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts,
51 Nw. U.L. REv. 407, 409 (1956) ; Warren, supra note 39, at 83. Cf. S. REP. No. 1830,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1958); THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 80 and 81 (Hamilton). But
see Friendly, supra note 39, at 492-98 (challenges "bias" argument). Compare Yntema &
Jaffirt, supra note 39, at 873-76 (questioning Friendly's conclusion).
41. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
42. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816). See Wright,
The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs L. REv. 815 (1959).
43. One of the first measures enacted by the first Congress was The Judiciary Act
of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), which proved for diversity jurisdiction (1 Stat. 78) as author-
ized by Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. The present statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
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to be a real one.44 The existence of a second, perhaps more sophisticated kind
of bias against litigants denied a federal forum, has also been suggested as
a modem basis for diversity. Whether or not juries are prejudiced against
out-of-staters, they may, it is thought, be biased against certain classes of liti-
gants, especially large corporations and financial institutions. The present
guarantee of a federal forum, then, may be designed so to calm corporate and
financial entities that they will establish business activity throughout the
nation.4 5 Identification of other protections afforded by diversity is even more
speculative, but also suggests the importance of preserving the federal trial
forum. Commentators have suggested that, in addition to the guarantee of
an unbiased trier of fact, protection against incompetent state judges and pro-
tection from judges chosen in a manner which might make them susceptible
to extra-judicial pressures,46 might be a significant goal of diversity. Federal
44. Congress has from time to time altered the scope of diversity jurisdiction. HART
& WECHSLER 898-900. Most recently (in 1958), the jurisdictional amount was raised,
along with certain other restrictions. 72 Stat. 415 (1958), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (juris-
dictional amount), and (c) (corporations) (1958). There have been proposals to abolish
the jurisdiction entirely. See Frankfurter, supra note 39. In the early 1930's the Senate
Judiciary Committee reported bills for the abolition. S. REP. No. 530, .72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932); S. REP. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). The bills were not passed. The
preliminary drafts of the American Law Institute's Study of the Diversity Jurisdiction
indicates support for a sharp restriction of the jurisdiction. Frank, For Maintaining Di-
versity Jurisdiction, 73 YA E L.J. 7 (1963) ; Kurland, The New Field Code - The A.LJ.
Proposed Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 11 THE [UNVERsITY
OF CHICAGO] LAw SCHOOL RcORD, No. 2, p. 11 (1963).
45. It is hard to be convinced that the gTeat mobility which marks our present society
would crumble if the diversity jurisdiction were curtailed or abolished. But see Parker,
supra note 35, at 409-10, and materials cited therein; S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19-20 (1958).
By extending diversity jurisdiction to suits between "citizens of different States"
without attempt to restrict the right to invoke it to the out-of-state party, either in orig-
inal or removal proceedings, Congress has discarded the notion that diversity is for the
protection only of out-of-state litigants against the unknown, but presumed, vagaries of
the state courts. The removal statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958). See Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and The Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 236-37
(1947).
It is sometimes argued that the ends which the presumption of bias is intended to
protect would be adequately preserved if the parties could obtain a federal forum upon
a showing of actual bias, or if they had an ultimate right to raise that question on appeal
or certiorari to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra, at 236. However, a re-
quirement that actual bias be shown will present immediate problems of proof which
may be impossible for the litigant to meet; even if possible, the burden in both time
and finances may be so great as to discourage the attempted showing. The Framers of
the Constitution seem to have rejected the adequacy of such a system. Cf., HART &
WECHSLER 17.
46. See, e.g., Kurland, note 44 supra, at 12 (quoting the unpublished A.L.I. study);
S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1958); Friendly, supra note 39, at 497-98.
"[F]ederal judges appointed for life are more likely to enforce the constitutional rights
of unpopular minorities than elected state judges." Douglas, J., England v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 427 (1964). See id. at 427-28.
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
procedures, to the extent not supplanted by Erie or mimicked by the states,47
the federal judge-jury relationship, 48 and the benefits of a federally constituted
record, 49 may be an impetus to a litigant to choose the federal courthouse.
Although no one rationale for diversity may be persuasive, it is clear that
litigants have continually found advantages to suit in federal court. Congress
has certainly the power to deny a remedy for the presumptive bias, by abolish-
ing or curtailing diversity jurisdiction. Once it has provided relief, however,
- as it has since the First Judicary Act of 1789 - the queston is how far the
courts may go in denying it. Relying largely upon another dictum of Chief
Justice Marshall,5 0 some have argued that the federal court's jurisdiction is
mandatory, and when properly invoked must be exercised. Of course, this
notion has been weakened by the earlier abstention cases, where the courts
have assumed the power to curtail the federal jurisdiction in deference to the
strong policy reasons of comity and avoidance of unnecessary constitutional
decisions.51 But it is also arguable that these curtailments are consistent with
congressional policy pre-dating Pullman,52 and manifested in the Johnson
Act, 53 the Tax Injunction Act,5 4 and the Three Judge District Court Act.
While the Court has never relied upon the policy of these enactments, the
underlying rationales of those acts is strikingly analogous to the reasoning in
the early abstention cases.5 6 The Tax Injunction Act prohibits district courts
47. Post-Erie cases deny litigants many of the significant benefits of the federal
procedure where state procedure is substantially different. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). And many states
have adopted procedural reforms similar to the federal rules. See Frank, supra note 44,
at 11.
48. The judge-jury relationship may vary appreciably between the federal and state
courts. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elect. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958); Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 52-53 (1954).
49. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17
(1964) ; id. at 436 (separate opinion of Douglas, J.). Other "reasons" for a litigant to
prefer the federal forum exist. Locale of the respective courthouses, relative calendar
congestion and the litigant's guess that the federal court will be less likely to depart from
old state precedents may shape the decision,. These ephemeral considerations may cut
either way depending upon the litigant's individual situation.
50. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). See, e.g., Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 39 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ; Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 223 n.19 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting),
for recent instances where that argument has been used.
51. Cf., Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. Rev. 1082,
1095 (1963).
52. See Wright, supra note 42, at 815.
53. 48 Stat. 775 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958). See HART & WECHS-
LER 855-56.
54. 50 Stat. 738 (1937), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958). See HART & WECHS-
LER 856-57.
55. 36 Stat. 557 (1910), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958). See HART & WECaS-
LER 846-55.
56. Cf. HART & WECHSLER 847-57. See generally WRIGHT §§ 47-51.
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from interfering with "the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law ;,,57 the Johnson Act similarly prohibits the district courts from in-
terfering with "any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility . ..
made by a State administrative agency. . .. ,,58 Both provisions only apply
where "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State."5 9 Suits for injunctions to restrain enforcement of any state statutes
upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute are required to be decided
by a special three-judge district court,60 from whose judgment a direct appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court.6' The argument that jurisdiction is man-
datory is far stronger for such cases as Green and Delaney, for Congress has
seen fit to curtail federal jurisdiction only in limited areas.
2
As a first proposition, then, the holding of Meredith, that a suit cannot be
dismissed from federal court because state law which will be the basis of de-
cision is unclear, should remain in force. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
itself remained careful not to question it.63 Federal court action which, although
denominated a stay, has all the effects of dismissal,6 would also seem to be
an improper renunciation of jurisdiction. And if abstention such as occurred
in Delaney were essayed at the trial court level, it can hardly be doubted that
an effective dismissal would occur. The state courts to which the parties were
referred would likely wish to engage in full-blown fact-finding themselves,
and litigants faced at such an early stage with the prospect of two suits where
they had expected but one might often confine their attentions to the state
litigation. The advantages supposed to arise from use of diversity jurisdiction
are most relevant at the trial stage, where judicial action which inevitably
discourages parties from availing themselves of a federal right persistently
offered them by Congress does not seem justified by the rewards to be gained
from an authoritative statement of state law.
Green and Delaney at Appellate Level
When abstention is permitted at the appellate court level, on the grounds
of unclear state law, litigants are likely to be, deprived of only minor benefits
accruing from diversity jurisdiction. In such cases abstention would be im-
57. 28 U.S.C.§ 1341 (1958).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
59. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958) with 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
62. Congress has consistently refused to substantially affect the availability of diversity
jurisdiction. See note 44 supra. See also S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1958).
63. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) was cited approvingly by the
Court in Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 27 and more recently in McNesse v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 673 n.5 (1963) (dictum).
64. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1963). See also and compare
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 414-19 (1964)
(Brennan, J., for the Court), with id., at 426-29 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result).
See Note, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1358, 1361-68 (1960) ; Note, 64 COLUMi. L. Rv. 766 (1964).
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plemented by the circuit court staying its appellate jurisdiction to await the
resolution of state law questions by the appropriate state courts. This would
come only after there had been a full federal trial on the merits. To some
extent there would also have been a fairly complete federal appeal. No judge's
decision will be vacated, no jury verdict will be upset because of any "error"
committed by the district judge's failure to abstain. The role of the state
court would be to simply declare "authoritatively" what the state law is. It
is not doubted that under Erie a federal court must follow state law as the
rule of decision. Save for considerations of cost and delay which abstention
may add to a litigation, it may well be thought that it is irrelevant to the
litigants that the judges may ascertain state law by one process or another
- by consulting with their law clerks or by abstaining in favor of their state
counterparts.
But abstention imposes an additional burden, and one that is unwanted
by at least one of the parties. The litigants will already have made a substan-
tial investment in their federal cause of action at the trial level. For them the
doctrine has the effect of "making two law suits grow, where only one grew
before," with concommitant expense and delay.0 5 Indeed the possibility of
imposing such delay and/or expense upon his adversary may be the principal
reason behind a litigant's espousal of the doctrine. 6 To the individual litigant,
the possibility of ultimate disparity between state and federal decision may
. 65. See note 83 infra. The federal forum in a diversity suit will always be the choice
of either the plaintiff who invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958) or
of the defendant who secured removal from a state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
66. It is likely that this was a factor in Thibodaux, note 15 supra. The petitioner re-
moved to the federal district court. When that court abstained on its own motion, the
defendant city appealed and the district judge was reversed. On certiorari to the Supreme
Court it was the petitioner power company, which had originally opted for the federal
forum by removing, that was now demanding referral to the state courts. It is curious
that the governmental party did not oppose a federal determination of the relevant un-
construed state statutes. The effect of Thibodaux was to give the power company "the
best of all possible worlds."
[T]he doctrine of abstention ... can become [an effective tactic] in the hands of
a defendant anxious to postpone decision .... In a removable case to which the
doctrine ... is held applicable there is nothing the plaintiff can do to avoid con-
siderable delay, additional labor and expense. For if he files his claim in state
court, it can be removed, and stayed, and he will be compelled to initiate a new
action in the state court, prosecute it there through appeal, then return to the
Federal court for further proceedings, and probably review on appeal. Filing
initially in the Federal court saves him little, since he must still start over in the
state court, and eventually return to the Federal forum.
...This "judicial sanction of professional astuteness" can but encourage "the
,natural selfishness of litigants to exploit the law's weaknesses.' [Quoting Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, in, Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348
U.S. 48, 57 (1954); the words were there used in a different context.]
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, pp. 14-15, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).: (Footnotes omitted.)
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not be of overriding importance - he likely has little concern with the aesthetics
of the legal order and, by hypothesis, knows the law to be presently uncertain
when he begins his suit. Naturally, every litigant seeks and desires a favorable
decision in any suit to which he is a party. At least, however, litigants do
have the right to an impartial, uniform and prompt decision by judges doing
their best, not their worst.67 And they receive that exactly when non-abstaining
federal judges decide their claims. The litigants have had their "day in court,"
and their claims are resolved. Such a decision in the present may be more
highly valued than some "more perfect" decision in the future.6 8 If a litigant
chooses to bring suit in a federal court, for whatever reasons may have been
persuasive to him, and a complete denial of federal jurisdiction is not called
for by considerations of constitutional policy or comity, consigning him to the
half-way house of abstention may, from his perspective, involve a senseless
and intolerable burden.
The decision to abstain or not, however, may have an impact upon other
participants in the legal system than the parties to a particular litigation. One
serious effect which might be thought to flow from the possibility of divergent
decisions is the disruption of legitimate private ordering.69 In the interim be-
tween the rendering of a federal decision and qn "authoritative" state decision,
persons entitled to reliance may feel prior arrangements to be in doubt or
may base new arrangements on the federal statement, albeit the "true" state
rule may be quite different once the state court is given the opportunity to
declare it.7 ° Another possibility is a more casual attitude on the part of federal
judges, who may lose hope of being able to render acceptable opinions and,
however unconsciously, begin to direct their fullest efforts to other questions,
where they may bear a more continuing responsibility. In a circuit such as
the Fifth, where through repeated failures to divine state trends,71 the judges
seem to have become infected with a strong disinclination to grapple with
67. Cf. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALm L.J. 762 (1941).
68. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, at 293. In none of the four cases in which the Florida
certification device has been used, have the litigants asked the court to abstain. Dresner
v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 and 249
(1963) ; Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) ; Green v. American To-
bacco Co., Further Supplemental Brief for Appellee Re Possible Certification to Florida
Supreme Court, pp. 1-2; ef., 304 F.2d 70, 85-6 (1962).
69. Cf., A.F.L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Wis.
1960) where the District judge said: "No attorney could conscientiously advise a client"
under the existing circumstances of uncertain state law. Id. at 59-60. See note 27 supra
for background on A.F.L. Motors case.
70. Some undesirable forum shopping may occur during the interim between the
federal and state decisions caused by litigants jockeying for position in the forum most
likely to follow a desired rule. But, this very effect may have the result of bringing the
question before a state court at the earliest possible date.
71. Cf. United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486-87 nn. 5-9 (5th
Cir. 1964) (concurring opinion of Brown, J.).
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-testy state law questions, litigants may appear to be better served by a state
court than a federal.
The weight to be attached to the possibility of disparities can be too easily
exaggerated. It is surely true that state courts may "reverse" federal determi-
nations of state law. However, in many instances, there will be no difference
in the respective decisions.7 2 State courts are likely to reach the same results
as federal courts have previously ;73 counsel responsible for private ordering
may be expected to appreciate the stature of a federal decision under Erie.
and to treat the state law as still unsettled. And apparent dissimilarities may
be illusory, if accounted for by differences in the factual patterns presented.
Further, it should be remembered that, while in theory abstention will produce
an "authoritative" answer not liable to "be displaced tomorrow by a state
adjudication," in fact, abstention does not assure this to be so. Parties re-
mitted to state courts for declaratory judgment, for example, may, for various
reasons, choose not to take appeals from the initial state decision to the highest
state court; they may not even appeal to an intermediate appellate court. In
such a case, while the decision obtained is clearly the law of the case in the
,federal court, under current Erie dogma it is clear that the state court decision
may not be controlling upon a federal or state court in another case.7 4 The
Fifth Circuit, apparently in an effort to remedy this situation, ordered the
parties in Delaney to pursue their declaratory judgment proceedings to the
highest available state court; but this authority was purchased only at the ex-
pense of considerable additional delay and cost to the litigants. It is surely
open to question whether individual litigants -should be made to bear the
costs - in time and expense - of correcting the imperfections and inadequa-
-cies of the legal system - imperfections and inadequacies with which the
-non-institutional litigant may have no concern.
The existence of what may ultimately come to be a lone federal precedent
on a question of state law may even have adyantages to the system. It may
provide limited experience with a rule of law, and may provoke academic or
judicial commentary on the proposed rule of law. Thus, when ultimately
called upon to make its "authoritative adjudication," the state court will
have additional and valuable materials at hand. Indeed, the state court may
ultimately reach a result inconsistent with the earlier federal case only because
this dialogue pointed out the pitfalls of the federal decision. 75
72. E.g., the especially interesting case of Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir.
1945), followed in Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E. 2d 810 (1947).
73. See text accompanying note 75 in ra.
•74. See King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153
(1948). But cf., Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940) (criticized sharply
by Corbin, supra note 67). See 1A MOORE ff 0.307[2), at 3305-10.
75. Federal participation may induce a certain degree of nation-wide uniformity of
state law. Cf. HART & WECHSLER 89 (Item 4). See Yntema & Jaffin, supra note 39, at
881 n.23. In this extensive footnote, the authors question whether there was a development
of uniform national law arising from Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Federal
courts are said to play a substantial role "as leaders in the movement for the improvement
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That the new use of the abstention doctrine has been developed in the Fifth-
Circuit, where state-federal relations are strained, suggests that it may have
both origins and merits in the realm of "federalism. ' 7 5 Just as the overruling
of Swift v. Tyson 76 may in some sense have been a response to state sensi-
tivity to the vigorous growth of federal regulatory activity, it may be postu-
lated that the Fifth Circuit is in some way, however unconscious, compensating
the Southern states for its vigorous advances against their traditional social
fabric. To the extent that past history has shown that court to be inaccurate
in forecasting state law developments, 77 use of abstention would avoid exacer-
bation which must accompany each "overruling." The feeling that the federal
court was "cooperating" in the search for state law rather than seeking to
impose its will upon the state might even make state judges more receptive
to federal views, when federal questions were before state judiciaries.
The argument for avoiding disparity, if carried to its logical conclusion
and distinctions do not appear which would enable courts to hold the line
short of that conclusion - would sap federal judges of any vital role in di-
versity cases. The Erie case was widely criticized for depriving federal judges
of their traditional law declaring functions ;78 in the absence of the abstention
of the administration of justice." Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights,
40 TEXAS L. REv. 211, 213 (1961).
For the great virtue of the Federal system is that each state becomes . . . a labora-
tory in which [each of] the other . . . States can see how theories actually work
when put into practice. No one state . . . can injure the nation as a whole, and
the follies of one state are almost certain to teach wisdom to the others ....
Walter Lippman, New York Herald Tribune, June 2, 1936, quoted in THuRMOND
ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPrrALTSM 94 (1937). Arnold sharply disagrees with this
notion. See id. at 93-96.
Cf., Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 COLUM L. REv. 543-46
(1954). See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv.
489, 492 (1954). Professor Hart has stated:
Constitutional impediments to centralized direction, in those matters in which there
is no compelling need for national action, appear as safeguards against impairments
of the viability of the social mechanism as a whole. The resulting disparities in the
formal law of different states are notable chiefly as reflections of a necessary inde-
pendence and even competition in the wise guidance of social affairs . . . [by
the states].
Id. at 490-91.
Cf., Mr. Justice Holmes' eloquent dissent in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928).
75a. The Fifth Circuit is also probably the largest and most overworked of the courts
of appeal. Lewis, Choosing a Judge May Tax Johnson, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1964, p. 21,
col. 4 (City ed.).
76. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
77. See United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486-87 nn. 5-9 (5th
Cir. 1964) (concurring opinion of Brown, J.).
78. See, e.g., Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941);
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tomp-
kins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946).
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doctrine, however, the Erie doctrine does not bind the creative federal judge
to the extent that its critics pretend. Among other duties, it leaves to federal
judges the function of declaring state law where there was no discernible
answer to the question in pronouncements of the state institutions. Abstention,
if applied across the board, in cases of the Green and Delaney variety, would
mean that federal judges not only must obediently follow well-found state
precedents, 79 but that they must farm out to the state judiciary responsibility
for the decision of questions of unsettled state law. Accordingly, opponents of
abstention can mount a convincing argument that federal judges would be
reduced to little more than sterile monitors shuttling traffic between a dual
system of courts at appropriate stages of the litigation. Litigants would, again,
be discouraged from invoking the diversity jurisdiction as judges felt them-
selves under greater pressure to invoke the doctrine, and apparent congres-
sional intent would be, to that extent, disserved.
The Uses of Certification
An assessment of the advantages and disadvantages occasioned by the use
of abstention in cases of unclear state law does not lead to a clear preponder-
ance, for many of the factors discussed are extraordinarily elusive. In such
a situation, it is tempting to take the easy road, stating that the more definite
factors - cost to litigants and incursion upon the diversity function - force
the conclusion that the Fifth Circuit's use of the doctrine was improper. It
may not be entirely cynical to view abstention as a "legal research luxury,"80
of no appeal to the litigants to any given suit, and of but questionable value
to the legal system as a whole. Certainly, in view of the sometime harsh effects
which the doctrine's use will impose upon litigants and other participants in
the legal process, the price which must be paid for abstention is higher than
the "easy" adoption of the device by the Fifth Circuit would suggest.81 How-
ever, if some of these unpalatable results 'can be substantially mitigated, the
case against abstention may not be so clear. Prior discussion suggests that
these effects become more acute as use of the doctrine becomes more general,
and as the state procedures to which litigantsmust repair to obtain the "authori-
tative" pronouncement on state law become more intricate. If one is convinced
that the doctrine does provide some advantages to the system, then a sparing
use, in situations which present the possibility of a "plain, speedy and efficient"
state procedure for the ascertainment of state law, may well be seen to pro-
vide circumstances suitable for invocation of the doctrine.
79. Cf., Professor Corbin's sharp criticism of this alleged stultification of the federal
judiciary brought about by Erie, Corbin, supra note 78, at 762.
80. The phrase is Mr. Justice Douglas'. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 425 (1964).
81. See note 83 infra. Mr. Justice Douglas has suggested that in some cases the con-
sequence of abstention "seems like an unnecessary price to pay for our federalism."
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964).
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As a first step in obtaining such a tempered use of abstention, it seems
possible to give some content to the criterion "unclear state law." A hierarchy
of values may be helpful.Y An unconstrued state constitutional provision, being
the fundamental law of the State, seems to be entitled to the greatest respect
by the federal courts. State statutes, being the expressed will of the legislature,
would seem to be almost equally deserving of respect. Thus, a coordinate
branch of the same governmental system responsible for the questioned enact-
ment ought to be given the opportunity to construe it as broadly as it wished,
so as to squarely present any issue which a federal court would be tempted
to avoid by a narrower construction. State courts may be significantly more
expert than federal courts in the understanding and construction of state
legislative intent. Questions of state common law appear to be more trouble-
some; although state court pronouncements are more authoritative, there is
no reason to expect that they will be rendered with significantly greater skill
than would be the case in the federal courts. Yet it may be possible to identify
the significant areas of state concern -areas closely allied with statutory
regulation and hence of greater delicacy. Other questions may be deserving of
state determination because they deal with an area of law which is under-
going significant development, or because the law of other jurisdictions is in
sharp conflict, suggesting the need for a fundamental policy choice. Indeed,
the question in Green, relating to the liability of cigarette companies for in-
juries from lung cancer, may be just such an issue. If the federal judge is
convinced that the question posed to him is close to a matter of central and
continuing state concern, then, he may be justified in invoking the doctrine.
Since at the appellate level the principal cost- of abstention is in expense
and delay to litigants, the federal court could properly be far more liberal in
abstaining where, in the particular case, these factors were demonstrably
unimportant, or likely to be held in check by the procedures available in state
courts. Where implemented by means of declaratory judgment, abstention
has shown itself to be a slow and costly process for the litigants, often re-
quiring them to proceed through the multiple tiers of two independent judicial
systems.8 3 The Florida certification device,84 on the other hand, allows liti-
82. Cf. Wright, supra note 42, at 826.
83. Delay is a frequent concommitant of abstention. E.g., see the discussion of the
long trek through the courts of Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee,
CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) in BARR N & HOLTZOFF § 64, at 343; Wright,
supra note 42, at 817.
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States began in August, 1953.- In 1957, the Supreme
Court ordered abstention. 352 U.S. 220 (1957). Subsequently, Louisiana courts rendered
three opinions. The case has just returned to the Fifth Circuit. No. 19963, 5th Cir., March
3, 1964. See also Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 346-48 (1963); Mr. Justice Douglas's
separate opinion in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 136
(unnumbered footnote) (1962) (per curiam). Mr. Justice-Douglas's dissent in Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) suggested:
Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one law-
suit, let alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal tribunals is a
sure way of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not ar academic
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gants to skirt the lower state courts entirely and to obtain a judgment directly
from the highest state court in answer to propounded questions of state law,
a procedure which may result in considerable savings of time and expense. 8r,
It assures that the state court resolution is, in Justice Frankfurter's word,
"authoritative," because it is rendered by the highest state court - a quality
which declaratory judgment does not necessarily produce. Certification also
has the benefit of clearly preserving the federal fact-finder and of closely
limiting the state court consideration to the matters of concern to the federal
court. Although in the few cases to date in which the Florida process has been
used the questions have been quite properly framed in a factual setting, they
were sent up on a federal record, 6 with the litigants briefing and arguing
exercise. There are no [private charitable] foundations to finance the resolution
of nice state law questions involved in federal court litigation.
See also, Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights, 40 TEX. L. REv. 211, 221
(1961) ; separate opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 425-6 (1964). And compare, RABELAIS. COMPLETE
WORKS 445-453 (Mod. Lib. ed. [Le Ciercq trans.]).
84. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961). Great Britain has long had a comparable
statute (Foreign Law Ascertainment Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vicr., c. 11). It has apparently
met with little success. Cf., DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1115 (Morris' 7th ed. 1958). In
this country the Florida statute is unique. It was used for the first time, at the urging of
the Supreme Court, in connection with Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212
(1960). The Court has sanctioned the use of § 25.031 in several subsequent cases, seem-
ingly well pleased with its operation. See Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, Fla., 375 U.S.
136 (1963) ; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 and 249 (1963). See also separate opinion
of Douglas, J., in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
433-34 (1964). See generally Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IowA L. REv.
629 (1951) (certification generally); Note, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 344 (1963).
85. The certification device has not resulted in speedy resolution in either of the
two cases which have been sent to the Florida Supreme Court, and which that court
has answered. In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) recourse to certifica-
tion was ordered June 13, 1960. On remand, the Fifth Circuit certified questions to the
Florida court on August 12, 1960; the Florida court's opinion is dated October 18, 1961
(133 So. 2d, 735). The Fifth Circuit's decision, 319 F.2d 505, was dated June 19, 1963,
and the case is again before the Supreme Court at the current term on certiorari. Cert.
granted, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The Clay suit was originally commenced on May 20, 1957.
319 F.2d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 1963).
. In Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) abstention was ordered
on June 20, 1962. A certificate was issued on August 8, 1962. The Florida court's opinion
(154 So. 2d 169) was decided on June 5, 1963 and received by the Fifth Circuit June
2.4, 1963. The Fifth Circuit opinion, 325 F.2d 673, is dated December 11, 1963. However,
it would seem that the process could be significantly speeded up by cooperation between
the state and federal courts. Obviously the cost of certification is less than obtaining
declaratory judgment. Cf., Note, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv. 344, 348 (1963).
86. FLA. APP. R. 4.6 promulgated under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961) provides:
Rule 4.6(d) The certificate . . . shall contain . . . a statement of facts showing
the nature of the cause and the circumstances out qf which the questions or prop-
ositions of law arise....
Rule 4.6(e) . . . The Supreme Court may, in its discretion require . . . all or
any portion of the record before the federal court to be filed with said certificate....
See In re Florida Appellate Rules, 127 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1961) for the complete
text of Rule 4.6. The rules are also found in Volume 31 of FLA. STAT. ANN. (1962 Supp.).
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only questions of law in the state court.8 7 Given the speed, authority and
economy possible using certification procedures, abstention under these pro-
cedures could tolerably range a far wider scale of state law questions than
abstention implemented by declaratory judgment.
One question which might be raised with regard to the certification pro-
cedure is whether it ought to be broadened, so as to be made available to
federal district courts. The earlier abstention cases clearly allowed these courts
to order abstention in proper cases.88 Yet, though it has been suggested that
a district court could request its circuit court to make the certification for it,89
the present Florida certification statute provides that only federal appellate
courts may certify questions of Florida law to that state's Supreme Court.90
Certification, it can be argued, derives much of its attractiveness from its po-
tential for expedient resolution of state law questions by the highest state
court; this potential for speed is offset if a trial court may not abstain via the
certification device. For example, a party may learn in answer to a certificate
sent after an appeal, that the original complaint failed to state a cause of action
or that the federal trial court's resolution of a state law question was inaccurate,
although it was apparent in pre-trial stages that a question needed to be re-
solved by the state court.01 On balance, however, it would seem that there
is more wisdom in restricting the device's availability to the appellate level.
For federal policy, the principal consideration is preservation of the federal
fact finding forum for the party who has opted for diversity. Abstention at
such an early stage seems to threaten his ability to shape his presentation of
87. Present Florida rules require that the parties file briefs. FLA. App. R. 4.6(g)
(Supp. 1962). The court may grant oral argument. FLA. App. R. 4.6(h) (Supp. 1962).
88. E.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
89. Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and Its Impact on The Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAmI L. REV. 413,
431 (1962) ; Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1358, 1368 (1960) ; Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344,
357-58 (1963).
-Such a possibility is by no means clear from the statute. Under FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 25.031 (1961) a federal appellate court may certify "questions or propositions of the
laws of this state, which are determinative of the ... cause" if they are "involved in any
proceeding before it." (Text of the law transposed, and emphasis added.)
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961). Apparently the draftsmen of § 25.031 had
no particular reason for restricting the power to certify to appellate courts, other than
to curtail the volume of certificates.
When the original bill was drafted ... its use was limited to the federal appellate
courts largely because . . . we did not want too many certificates coming in to
the Supreme Court that might clutter up its docket. We know of no legal reason
why Section 25.031 might not be made available to the lower federal courts. The
use of said section by lower federal courts seems to be more a matter of policy
than a legal one.
Letter from Hon. Fred M. Burns, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, December
19, 1963, to the Yale Law Journal, on file in Yale Law Library. Mr. Burns drafted the
statute.
91. See A.F.L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56, 61 (E.D.
Wis. 1960).
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legal issues in federal court. State'policy is remarkably similar; the Supreme
Court of the.state can be expected'to prefer questions accompanied by a full
factual record to abstractions smacking of "advisory opinions." A constitu-
tional provision similar to the federal "case or, controversy" clause might
render such a preference mandatory.92 Moreover, all the policies usually
associated with ripeness and finality seem to apply. Questions which appear
at pre-trial and early trial stages may disappear by the time a verdict has been
returned. In a case like Green, the question of Florida law certified could
have been rendered moot by a jury finding that there was no causal relation-
ship between smoking and the plaintiff's cancer. In other cases, a question
of state law might not appear until the final stages of litigation, and if certi-
fication had been allowed at an early stage, multiple certifications could arise
causing considerable delay.9 3 Restricting certification to appellate courts will
also prevent an inordinate number of cases flooding the state court on cer-
-tificates.94 Although the Florida statute, which is permissive rather than man-
datory, allows the state court wide discretion in deciding whether or not to
answer a certificate, 95 in practice it may well be considered impolitic for a
state court-to refuse to take the opportunity to answer the propounded ques-
-tions.96 Moreover, restricting the right of federal courts to certify may provide
an inherent selectivity; since only appeals courts may certify, only those
cases which are deemed significant to the parties will be eligible for abstention
via certification.
It appears that the certification device is susceptible of perfection to a degree
that will substantially eliminate delay and, to a large extent, eradicate the
costliness of declaratory judgment. If abstention is to be expanded or even
if it is to be limited to its present scope, it seems highly desirable that certifi-
cation procedures be made generally available.9 7 This can, of course, be achieved
92. For a discussion of the "case and" controversy" and related problems see Note,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 351-57 (1963).
93. -In some cases abstention at pre-trial stages may be appropriate. The e-dstence of
a constitutional question in the Pullman-type case appeared in the pleadings. The plead-
ings would also clearly establish that the suit is one to enjoin a state administrative
agency - the touchstone of the Burford-type abstention.
94. See note 90 supra (Letter of Hon. Fred M. Bums).
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 ('1961). See also FLA. App. R. 4.61(a) (Supp. 1962).
The state court may not desire to answer the question; and possibly could avoid doing
-so in a purely intra-system case if it had discretionary powers of review. See, Vestal,
supra note 84, at 646-47.
Presumably the certification statute does not prevent a federal district court from
directing the parties to use the declaratory judgment method of effectuating an abstention
order issued by it, or in a case where the Florida Supreme Court declines to answer the
certificate. Florida has such a procedure. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.01-.13 (Supp. 1962).
96. Note the open expression of gratitude by the Fifth Circuit to the Florida Supreme
Court. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F 2d 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1963).
97. Cf., Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960); Note, 73 HIAv. L. REv. 1358, 1368-69
(1960) ; Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, passim (1963).
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most readily by state legislation. The most satisfactory solution, undoubtedly,
lies in uniform legislation, which might be closely modeled after the Florida
statute,98 even though in some jurisdictions some constitutional changes may
be required to effectuate the provision for certification. 99 Perhaps in some
jurisdictions the necessary procedure could be attained by less drastic changes
- for example, modification of existing declaratory judgment processes to
enable litigants referred to state courts under the abstention doctrine to bypass
lower courts. If some states fear placing too great a burden upon their courts, 00
these fears would likely be stilled by development of a spirit of cooperation
between the two judicial systems, and a wise and -seasoned use of the certifica-
tion device by the federal courts. In any event, state establishment of the pro-
cedure seems preferable to federal imposition of it, which might not be com-
pletely effective. 0 1 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote in his separate opinion in Eng-
land v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners :102 "We cannot require the
States to provide ... a [certification] procedure . .,"10 indicating some doubt
of the Supreme Court's power to compel the state courts to answer certificates.
While it might be thought that Congress, if not the Court, could require such
reception by the states, the case law is far from persuasive. In Testa v. Katt,1 °4
a federal statute required state courts to entertain suits under the Emergency
Price Control Act; a-Rhode Island state court had refused to hear a cause
brought under the act. The Supreme Court said that the state court was not
entitled so to refuse jurisdiction, since the questions posed could be decided
and the remedies afforded could be given within the framework of judicial
machinery presently existing in the state. Certification is a very different
matter, for it may require an entirely new procedural framework within a
given state.10 5 It may raise serious problems under local "case and controversy"
requirements or exorcise a state's distaste for advisory opinions.'0 8 Even if
the Congress could force such a procedure upon the state courts, it seems
politically more desirable for the state independently to adopt the necessary
constitutional and statutory provisions.
Conclusion
Resolution of the broad questions raised'by the Fifth Circuit's expansive
use of the abstention doctrine in diversity suits, requiring as it does essentially
98. Such a statute has been proposed in a student note. See Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv.
344,363 (1963).
99. See Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 351-57 (1963).
100. See note 90 supra (Letter from Hon. Fred M. Bums).
101. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine
it; Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 214 (1957). See HART & WEcHS.R 395-99; Note,
73 HARv. L. REv. 1358, 1368 (1960).
102. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
103. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
104. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See sources cited note 101 supra.
105. States having intra-jurisdictional certification procedures and/or advisory opinion
procedures might not succeed in this argument.
106. See, e.g., Note, 40 TEXAS L. REv. 1041 (1962). Cf. CAHN, TnE MoRAL DEcsxiN
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political judgments as to the role of courts under federalism, is perhaps better
left to Congress than to the courts. 10 7 If the diversity jurisdiction is to be re-
nounced or substantially altered, the judgment seems best made through legis-
lative channels. To the extent earlier abstention cases presented these prob-
lems of federalism, the same conclusion suggests itself. Significantly, however,
in those cases there was a previously articulated congressional policy which
may have resolved any questions of federalism.' 08 Moreover, the abstention
sanctioned there encompassed only a very limited segment of the total juris-
dictional spectrum. An extension of the magnitude forecast by Green and
Delaney would substantially affect the federal jurisdiction and would run
counter to a consistent and long established congressional policy to preserve,
-undiluted, the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 0 9 If an apology is needed
for judicial usurpation in the earlier cases, it can perhaps be dismissed as
de minimis; the potential usurpation in Green and Delaney cannot be ex-
cused as lightly. If the courts are going to continue to act in this area, a
decision with the potential impact of Green is certainly deserving of more
than an unreasoned and unsupported opinion such as accompanied that case.
If inquiry into the problems of federalism that bear upon the decision of
whether or not to abstain persuade against abstention in cases such as
Green and Delaney, it does not seem that the mere availability of a certifi-
cation statute would justify abstention.'10 In the absence of considerations of
federalism to-support abstention, the inevitable added costs of litigation sug-
gest that use of the doctrine is inappropriate. Where the threshold questions of
federalism suggest that abstention may be appropriate, an assessment of these
costs is still essential. If the methods available for implementation of absten-
tion involve substantial delay or expense, or threaten complete loss of the
federal forum, the benefits flowing from use of the doctrine seem to be too
speculative to justify its use. Declaratory judgment proceedings seem to pose
such a threat. Certification is, by no means, a perfect device, but it may be
that it so mitigates the difficulties to litigants that the threat would be found
tolerable.
19 (1955).
107. Cf. M. H. Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law: Deference to State
Courts Versus Federal Responsibility, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 419, 426 (1960).
108. See notes 53-61 supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 44 supra.
110. The Court indicates that perhaps it has adopted a contrary attitude. The dis-
position by unreasoned per curiam orders of two cases at the current term in which certi-
fication was ordered suggests this attitude. See Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375
U.S. 136 (1963) ; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 and 249 (1963). See also the separate
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411, 433-34 (1964).
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